

Chapter 13

Human Capital: Boko Haram’s Exploitation of Women to Support and Finance Its Criminal Operations

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My brothers, you should take slaves. I kidnapped girls from a school, and you are irritated. I say we must stop the spread of Western education. I kidnapped the girls. I will sell them at the market, with Allah's help. There is a market where one can sell humans. Allah has told me to sell them. He commands me to sell them. I sell women. I sell women.

– **Abubakar Shekau, Leader of Boko Haram, April 2014**

Introduction

As terrorist groups evolve and act more like business entities, researchers and governments need to analyse trafficking activity and root motivations within an economic context if truly efficacious law and other measures are to be created and implemented. Founded by Mohammed Yusuf in 2002, Boko Haram is a Salafi religious movement with the stated intention of creating an Islamic state caliphate in northern Nigeria (Oriola, 2017). Boko Haram has been associated ideologically with other terrorist organisations including Al-Qaeda with affiliates pledging allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in 2015. Aligning with ISIL, the group even tried to “rebrand” itself as Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) (United Nations Security Council, 2020). Boko Haram's violent tendencies have grown from periodic attacks by young men on motorbikes to profoundly sophisticated assassinations, targeting civilians using suicide bombings and improvised explosive devices.

The group has matured and expanded its channels of armament. The group that once relied upon seizing weapons from local police stations and military barracks now acquires their arsenal from international war-torn states, smuggled through the porous borders of Nigeria (Nwankpa, 2015). Boko Haram maintains multiple revenue sources including the trafficking of illegal arms and ammunition, ransom, and taxing of local businesses and rival terrorist organisations (Amaliya & Nwankpa, 2014). However, among the atrocities committed by Boko Haram, gender-based violence (GBV) has been central to their strategy to exert power and procure financial gain (de Brouwer et al., 2020; Seddighzadeh, 2020).

Since 2009, Boko Haram has consistently evolved, changing its pattern of criminality to maintain operational viability. In recent years, Boko Haram has extended its criminal activity to include human trafficking. The kidnapping of Chibok schoolgirls is a prime example of such operations. Young girls abducted by Boko Haram are usually held hostage for ransom, offered as valuables in a proposed prisoner exchange, forcibly impregnated in an attempt to birth male offspring to be Jihadi fighters, and/or used as a source of retention or recruitment prizes for their “Jihadi troops.”

The nexus between human trafficking and terrorism is one of the least researched and understood topics in counter-terrorism academic circles. Boko Haram and the Islamic State have repeatedly demonstrated their ability and willingness to conduct human slavery and trafficking to attain organisational support and generate revenue. Economists and researchers have consistently suggested the importance of the accumulation of physical and human capital as an important source of economic growth (Zakaria et al., 2019; Tahir et al., 2019). *Human capital* is a bottomless currency that is best defined as a “unit-level resource created from the emergence of individuals' knowledge, skills, abilities, and other characteristics (KSAOs)” (Ployhart, 2011). However, terrorists' access to human capital for the purpose of terrorism, financial gain, and fulfilling religious schemata is a sign of the failing justice system and society as a whole. While trafficking is not

the penultimate crime for these militant groups, the multipurpose nature of female human capital serves to fuel their terror-infused politically motivated crimes. This chapter will review Boko Haram's tactical evolution to include human trafficking and will examine a multitude of ways that act as a conduit to gender-based violence and exploitation, supporting Boko Haram's organisational viability. Starting with an overview of Boko Haram, it will review the capture and exploitation of the Chibok Secondary schoolgirls and examine the benefits the organisation derives by utilising their female captives as "multipurpose capital resources."

Boko Haram

Boko Haram is considered one of the most notorious terrorist organisations in North-East Africa. Translated from Hausa, Boko Haram means "Western education is sinful" (The Cipher Brief, n.d.). Initially coined as "Jamā'a Ahl al-sunnah li-da'wa wa al-jihād" (Sunni Group for Preaching and Jihad) put forth by Muhammed Yusuf, the group adopted the name Boko Haram after his extrajudicial killing. The foundational ideology posed by Yusuf was nonviolent in nature with the primary goal being the establishment of a purified Islamic community in northern Nigeria. Soon after Yusuf's death, the group's ideology transformed into a more dogmatic and radicalised interpretation of Islam, which relied heavily on violence against civilians and minorities to achieve socio-political and economic agendas (Nwankpa, 2015). After his death, Abubakar Shekau took the chain of command and redeveloped their "operational" base into Sambisa Forest and rural areas near Borno State, the capital of Maiduguri. The resentment towards Yusuf's execution resulted in attacks against soft targets followed by highly sophisticated suicide bombings including the 2011 United Nations bombing in Abuja (Nossiter, 2011).

The main activities of Boko Haram have primarily focused on their operational base around northeastern states, especially Borno state as it is home to its "Kanuri-led leadership" (Nwankpa, 2015). Research suggests the group has expanded its presence internationally, including the Mandara Mountains in Cameroon and the islands of Lake Chad (Curiel et al., 2020). To achieve its religious and organisational goals, the group pledged allegiance to ISIL in 2015. This camaraderie between ISIL and Boko Haram soon faded as ISIL appointed Abu Musab Al-Barnawi (Mohammed Yusuf's eldest surviving son) as a de facto leader of Boko Haram instead of Shekau, fracturing the group into two competing factions. Shekau and his followers still operate under the original name – Boko Haram, while Al-Barnawi's faction identifies as ISWAP. ISWAP focuses largely on attacking Nigerian Security Forces, whereas Boko Haram has repeatedly targeted local populations, creating economic and social ills in the region.

Since its inception, Boko Haram has been responsible for the death of over 54,000 people and 30,000 civilians just over the last decade (Curiel et al., 2020). The group is a loose aggregate of independent cells united under the "Boko Haram" ideology. This constellation of parts results in a diverse series of recruitment methods and participant profiles (Matfess, 2017, p. 22). Some researchers suggest a disintegrated terrorist group divided into multiple cells is much more operationally effective and complex to counter than a well-organised traditionally structured group. Others have suggested a lack of centralised organisational control can cause recruitment and retention of fighters to be challenging (Onyebuchi & Chigozie, 2013). We believe individualised cells make up small elements of the Boko Haram movement that act as a force multiplier and building blocks – each focusing on the effective operationalisation of the group in different areas. The complexity of the cells makes it difficult for security personnel to identify, infiltrate, and disrupt.

Some of the main objectives of Boko Haram are to eradicate secular Westernisation, i.e., co-educational institutions in addition to girls' schools, democracy, and creating an Islamic state in Nigeria. The violent attacks by Boko Haram have led to over one million internally displaced persons and hundreds of thousands of refugees in neighbouring countries – Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. The Nigerian government, along with other regional governments, has attempted to repress the Boko Haram insurgency with specially designed task force operations. Benin, Chad, Niger, Cameroon, and Nigeria often rely on military and financial support from other countries and international organisations. Formed in 2014, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) was created by the Lake Chad Basin states – Benin, Chad, Niger, Cameroon, and Nigeria. Despite their efforts, the Council on Foreign Relations (Campbell, 2020) and the International Crisis Group question this task force's overall effectiveness (International Crisis Group, 2020).

The MNJTF is often faced with command-and-control issues, insufficient funding, and a lack of clarity in operational prioritisation. Numerous studies have highlighted an alarming amount of corruption and negligence on the part of Nigerian and neighbouring governments (Anyaeze, 2020). Boko Haram continues to benefit from economic and financial turbulence within these African states and the inability of MNJTF's continued efforts to subdue the insurgency. Despite the ratification of the United Nation's Palermo Protocol by all five countries, most impacted by the activities of Boko Haram, this terrorist group continues to operate trafficking activity with relative impunity. Boko Haram's tactical and operational flexibility continues to frustrate the Nigerian military and task force and has demonstrated a consistent ability to remain agile, forward thinking, and aggressive in its evolution to a rural insurgency capable of holding captured territory (Matfess, 2017, p. 24).

Policymakers' Dilemma: Financing and Corruption Is the Lifblood of Terrorism

Terrorism financing in Africa has long been a major security threat to the citizens of the African continent, especially Nigeria. Terrorism financing has consistently been a concern of national and international authorities like National Governments of Economic Community of West African State (ECOWAS) and Financial Action Task Force (FATF). According to FATF's annual reports, constant terrorism funding has negatively affected not only the administration of democracy but also the political stability and economic development in the African continent (FATF-GIABA, 2013, p. 5). This can be largely attributed to terrorists' access to porous borders and lack of surveillance, cash-based economy which allows for the movement of cash freely, and lack of coordinated international and domestic collaborative efforts (Nkwede et al., 2020). These efforts are heightened as the Nigerian government asserts Boko Haram derives revenue from cross-border forced prostitution and the selling of kidnapped children (FATF-GIABA-GABAC, 2016, P. 25).

The Nigerian policies against terrorist financing are consolidated under the Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act (TPAA) of 2013. The violence perpetrated by Boko Haram prompted the Nigerian government to pass the Terrorism Prevention Act (TPA). The primary motivation for the TPA was UN Resolution 1373, which was passed in response to September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States. Enacted in 2011, and amended in 2013, the TPAA provides a large array of offences that are punishable under the umbrella term of terrorism financing. TPAA prohibits

any person or entity in or outside Nigeria that solicits, acquires, provides, collects, receives, possesses or makes available funds, property or other services by any means to a terrorist organization or even individual terrorists with an intent to commit or facilitate terrorist attacks.

(Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act, 2013)

The offenders, depending on the seriousness of the crime, can face up to life imprisonment and all their assets and funds are frozen or transferred as a federal property. These cases are to be tried in the Nigerian Federal High Court (NFHC) and to avoid delay, the NFHC has the power to modify the procedural rule to expedite the administration of a trial. TPAA also contains provisions criminalising harbouring and/or providing material support to terrorist organisations (Ejeh et al., 2019).

The provisions of TPAA, although strong, have been met with some criticism from terrorist financing experts, for instance, failure to expressly mention state-terrorism or state-sponsored terrorist attacks. Additionally, section 28(4) of the TPAA allows for the court to grant bail to the offender within the 90-day detention period. This section states that

the person may, on the approval of the Head of the relevant law enforcement agency be placed under a house arrest and shall (a) be monitored by its officers; (b) have no access to phones or communication gadgets; and (c) speak only to his counsel until the conclusion of the investigation.

Given Nigeria has long struggled with corruption, such “minimal” requirement provisions can be susceptible to misuse. In addition, this provision contradicts the constitutional requirement of a federal court order to place a person under house arrest (Olaoye, 2020). The Nigerian counter-terrorist financing framework is very detailed; however, it is evident policymakers’ tunnel vision caused them to overlook how to holistically incorporate counter-terrorism policy consistent with their existing constitutional provisions. These incongruencies and discord underpin much of Nigeria’s perpetual struggle against corruption and social injustice. Corruption and lack of education, especially in Northeast Nigeria, have dramatically slowed economic development and growth.

The Nigerian government enacted the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act in 2000. Under this legal scheme, Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) was created as the investigative association to address corrupt practices conducted by government employees including federal agencies. The ICPC also sponsors public awareness campaigns educating Nigerian citizens against institutional and government corruption (Olaoye, 2020). Corruption, money laundering, and terrorist financing are all intertwined criminal activities. Holistic solutions must address these blights collectively. Although there is a dearth of literature on the collaborative work of entities investigating these issues, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) leads most of the financial crimes’ investigations in Nigeria. Convictions of financial crimes are low due to a corrupt and lax judicial system. In recent years, EFCC has been criticised by the United States Department of State for relying on confessions for convictions rather than working with prosecutors to build an effective case (U.S. Department of State, 2017). EFCC has repeatedly been chastised for its lack of collaborative efforts in sharing case information with other agencies for investigative purposes. This lack of sophisticated investigative techniques, desire, and the malfunctioning criminal justice system in Nigeria enables criminal actors like

Boko Haram to gain territorial control and exploit human beings into financial capital with impunity. Institutionalised corruption coupled with a depressed economy creates legislative quandaries for policymakers.

2014 Chibok Schoolgirls' Abduction

On the night of 14 April 2014, approximately 276 schoolgirls were abducted from the Government Secondary School in the town of Chibok in the Borno state of Nigeria. Boko Haram soldiers broke into the school, pretending to be guards (Committee on Foreign Affairs, 2014; Malik, 2017; Matfess, 2017; Khalaf & Hoffmann, 2017; Bauer, 2017). As part of their captivity, Boko Haram forced the Chibok schoolgirls to convert to a radicalised form of Islam and adhere to Sharia law. As part of this “conversion,” they were forced to refrain from wearing colourful clothes and adopt new names. Simultaneously, the *#BringBackOurGirls* social media campaign engrossed people around the world (Holpuch, 2018). This heightened awareness played an important role in bringing pressure on the government to secure the safety of the captives and began to shed international light on the violent tactics of Boko Haram. While women are often targeted and victimised using sexual violence in conflict-ridden regions, global attention is haplessly short-lived. On 12 May 2014, Boko Haram released a video displaying over 100 of the Chibok girls demanding the release of their imprisoned members in exchange for the girls' release. After extensive negotiations, the group's leaders specifically identified 16 senior commanders to be released; however, the Nigerian government called off the planned exchange after receiving significant pressure from the British, American, French, and Israeli governments (Matfess, 2017, pp. 72, 73). Without this 11th-hour interjection, the prisoner exchange would have likely succeeded.

In the following years, some of the kidnapped girls managed to escape the clutches of Boko Haram, while others were either freed in exchange for ransom or found “half-dead” tied to trees (Jones, 2014). Yet, 112 Chibok captives remain missing, presumably under Boko Haram's control (Human Rights Watch, 2019). As time passed, other governmental priorities took precedent over the rescue of these young women. Attention to these 112 girls and the *#BringBackOurGirls* campaign has declined precipitously in light of newer, more disconcerting acts of Boko Haram. Boko Haram significantly benefits from this waxing and waning pattern of attention. Leadership dedicates these periods of passivity to troop recuperation, bolstering their resources and capabilities and planning future attacks.

Evolution of Human Trafficking as a Terrorist Operational Finance and Funding Tactic and the Not Penultimate Criminal Event

Expanding our understanding of trafficking not only requires examinations of business sector exposure to forced labour in their supply chains but also requires us to understand how criminal terrorist organisations employ trafficking as a strategic tool to effectuate their terroristic political activity (Malik, 2019). For many, trafficking in persons is often considered the penultimate crime in a series of felonies. Boko Haram and the Islamic State have demonstrated their ability to apply trafficking in this manner to provide organisational support through numerous modalities including the retention and recruitment of fighting soldiers and the generation of hard currency revenue

(Committee on Foreign Affairs, 2014; Malik, 2017; Bauer, 2017; Bigio & Vogelstein, 2019, p. 1). The goal of these organisations is not to operate a human trafficking ring. They use the multipurpose capital resources extracted from the trafficked victims to solidify their organisational financial structure and advance their politically motivated crimes.

Human capital is best defined as a “unit-level resource created from the emergence of individuals’ knowledge, skills, abilities, and other characteristics.” The value of this category of an asset has been called “a phenomenon [as] emergent when it originates in the cognition, affect, behaviors, or other characteristics of individuals, is amplified by their interactions, and manifests as a higher-level, collective phenomenon” (Ployhart, 2011). An organisation benefits exponentially from identifying and exploiting all the methods these resources can advance its business goals.

Any organisation, regardless of its goal, will evolve tactics based on operational needs; Boko Haram is no different. As precisely as we examine human trafficking victims’ vulnerabilities through the push/pull factor lens, traffickers have push/pull factors that influence their willingness and tactical application to trafficking (Malik, 2017). As we will discuss, if considered a “multipurpose capital resource,” victims of traffickers supply a boon of capabilities. Trafficked human capital, managed effectively, can generate many benefits beyond hard currency. Boko Haram’s exploitation of women not only advances organisational goals but reinforces the gender-power inequities, undergirding the belief of female inferiority commonly held throughout Nigeria (Curiel et al., 2020). Female inferiority has a historical lineage in Nigerian society, in which Boko Haram is leveraging, benefiting, and perpetuating power and control mechanisms commonly exhibited in the trafficking relationships. It is also important to note that gender-based sexual violence is often normalised as a “quasi-natural” occurrence in crisis-ridden regions. Achieving the eradication of secular Westernisation is highly unlikely without power and control not merely over the territory but also over the region’s “human, sexual, and reproductive capital” (Asal & Nagel, 2021). Expanding territorial influence helps to institutionalise and preserve the “political, economic, and socio-cultural systems” maintaining the insurgency (Toft, 2010).

In 2010, the National Human Trafficking Resource Center (NHTRC) adapted the Duluth Model of Domestic Violence Power and Control Wheel to reflect the physical and coercive relationship present in trafficking (National Human Trafficking Resource Center [NHTRC], 2015; Domestic Abuse Intervention Programs [DAIP], 2017). Boko Haram’s tactics perfectly reflect the *modus operandi* articulated in the NHTRC wheel, e.g., needlessly hurting innocent civilians and abducting young children and women to display power and supremacy. The communal effect of these tactics on the Nigerian population warrants more research. Terrorists and traffickers hunt for vulnerable populations from which to extract human capital. Articulated best by Susan Bordo (2004), “[W]omen are often compelled into submission by the means of economic coercion, physical force, and emotional manipulation.” The micro-level interactions developing gender gaps create scripted beliefs with masculine control over political and apolitical matters, becoming an integrated part of the cultural values. North-East Nigeria struggles with this male hegemony. These control mechanisms allow men to perceive women as an expendable form of capital rather than a human being with agency. This objectification allows Boko Haram fighters to be indifferent towards women, making it easier for them to justify violence and exploitation.

One of the single most important factors concerning Boko Haram and its financial capital depends on the consistent access and control of alternative sources of revenue – specifically natural resources. The geopolitical and socio-cultural dynamics of the Sahel region are largely under-researched; however, there have been studies related to Boko Haram’s connections with the neighbouring states and their control over informal trade routes (Omenma, 2020). Nigeria among other countries on the Sahel belt has abundant natural resources, including oil reserves. Boko Haram is

keenly aware of the importance of the Lake Chad Basin as an economic backbone for Nigeria supporting fishing, farming, and access to water. Controlling these cross-border trade routes can serve as significant negotiation leverage with the associated governments. The Nigerian government has recurrently criticised the Chadian, Cameroonian, and Niger(ian) governments for softening policies towards the extremist activities enacted by Boko Haram in the region (Omenma, 2020).

Human Trafficking Operations Support the Evolution of Boko Haram Terrorist Tactics

The reconceptualising of human trafficking includes the recognition of it as a “weapon of terror” (The United Nations, Security Council, 2017; Omenma, 2020). We have not yet fully understood the multifaceted aspects and benefits extracted from human trafficking and its advantage to terrorist organisations. Nonetheless, the United Nations has condemned human trafficking, elucidating its part in “supporting terrorism, including through the financing of or recruitment for the commission of terrorist acts.” Carefully examining each unique and beneficial process derived from human trafficking, this section will provide strategic knowledge upon which governments and policymakers can build effective countermeasures. The following subsections describe the tactical and strategic methods employed by Boko Haram using human trafficking to support and finance its terrorist operations. The following list is randomised and not ordered by priority or prevalence, as that data is currently unavailable.

The Expanded Use of Female Suicide Bombers

While Boko Haram is not the first terrorist organisation to employ female suicide bombers, they are currently the most prolific (Bauer, 2017, pp. 19-118; Matfess, 2017; p. 7). In 2014, Boko Haram reportedly deployed their first female suicide bomber and by early 2018, about 468 women and girls had been utilised in 240 suicide attacks – the most by any terrorist movement, killing roughly 1,200 and injuring approximately 3,000 (Zenn, 2018, p. 33). Researchers have found that beyond coercion, female suicide bombers’ motives can range anywhere from personal loss, socioeconomic status of the family, redeeming family name, patriarchal society, achieving fame, being barren, and even escaping tedious life (Salem, 2015). In addition to these reasons, Boko Haram insurgents also violently “compel” abducted women, girls, and children to conduct suicide bombing operations. To maintain compliance, the group has often administered drugs to women in line to perform detonation (BBC, n.d.).

It is financially advantageous not having to replace male soldiers when the terrorist organisation can re-purpose female trafficked victims into “human artillery.” Female suicide bombers provide a strategic and tactical advantage to Boko Haram, in that they garner significantly more media coverage, are less likely to create suspicion, and are easier to conceal explosives because of Salafi female attire, and the group’s members find women to be highly “dispensable” resources, reinforcing the group’s ideology (Anyadike, 2019).

Human Trafficking Operations Provide Institutional Financial Support: Ransom and Prisoner Exchange

Human trafficking in its entirety means trading human beings and their services for financial gain by use of force, fraud, and coercion. Boko Haram is committed to the complete commodification

of its victims and capitalises on the social value of abducted women and girls by using ransom. Ransom generates direct revenue but also acts as a catalyst for a prisoner exchange. It is also notable that Boko Haram's "historical revenue streams," including taxation and sale of oil, have been steadily decreasing in Nigeria. Obtaining ransom payments has become a significant source of cash flow for the group (Taylor, 2017). In 2014, in exchange for the wife of a Cameroonian Deputy Prime Minister and ten Chinese engineers, Boko Haram extracted \$600,000 in ransom and bargained for the release of 30 soldiers from Cameroonian jails (Bloom & Matfess, 2016). Similarly, they extorted a total of \$3.7 million (divided into two payments) from the Nigerian government for releasing 103 girls from the Chibok kidnapping. Boko Haram freed 21 girls in 2016 and 82 more in 2017, after collecting both payments. This deal also involved intervention from the Swiss government and the Red Cross (Parkinson & Hinshaw, 2017).

Ransom is mostly associated with hard currency gain; however, Boko Haram has been using human capital to demand other commodities and perishable goods including cattle and grain. In 2014, the group also abducted 20 Fulani women from Gharkin Fulani, a nomadic village near Chibok, and demanded 800 cows for their release (Segun & Muscati, 2014). Unfortunately, the only form of income for the Fulani community was their cattle, and hence, many refused to give out their livelihood to their wives. Ransoming for Boko Haram has also included arrested insurgents. In 2017, 82 Chibok girls were exchanged for 5 high-level commanders in addition to the \$2.4 million (Matfess, 2017, p. 76). It is important to understand that Boko Haram's use of violence against women is calculated. In addition to the physical monetary gain, Boko Haram extracts further economic benefits contributing to the financial viability of their criminal enterprise (Committee on Foreign Affairs, 2014; Malik, 2017, p. 38) while also financially draining governments.

Trafficking Operations Supports Fighter Force: Recruitment, Retention, and Forced Insemination

Recruitment and Fighter Retention

Without a magnetic leader, or a galvanising centralised message, a group will struggle to maintain passion and attention for the rank-and-file members; decentralised groups tend to retrench and focus on local challenges that yield scattered, nonlinear, and erratic activity. Boko Haram utilises the exploitation of women as an incentive for fighters/members to stay engaged, while the leadership formulates the organisation's subsequent evolution. Boko Haram's exploits have highlighted a human trafficking phenomenon not commonly witnessed – *compound trafficking*.

Compound trafficking is present when a trafficker takes a victim from one modality of trafficking, followed by re-exploiting them to ensnare another trafficking victim of another modality. For instance, Boko Haram will utilise their female captives as retention or recruitment prizes to bolster their child soldier force. Here we have sexual exploitation victims helping facilitate child soldiering, a separate methodology of victimisation. The application of tactical multi-layered trafficking demonstrates a special level of depravity and indifference to human rights. Additionally, this kind of violence against women, especially rape, leads to the "destruction of social trust" making it complicated to achieve peaceful accords (Bloom & Matfess, 2016). In support of these arguments, a Human Rights Watch report (2013) suggested some families have offered their daughters as "gifts" to be married to Boko Haram soldiers. Hence, all outcomes largely favour the group – helping them gain more control, influence, and territory.

Forced Insemination

Of the Chibok girls released, at least eight of them had children while captive (Cohen & Nordås, 2015). This is understood to be a deliberate tactic and well-organised plan by Boko Haram to expand its ideology and insurgency into the next generation (Matfess, 2017, p. 75). Capturing, controlling, and exploiting women can be highly symbolic in terms of influencing successive generations. As Angela Dalton and Victor Asal (2011) stated, “the fact of being a female is proven to relish several tactical advantages. Symbolically, the death of women suicide bombers tends to evoke much more desperation and sympathy.” Similarly, power over women to procreate can demonstrate the group’s direct ability to affect the next generation, amplifying the group’s strength and (man)power. A new generation of children who adopt Boko Haram’s core concepts “can be raised through the cyclical constellation of mass rape of women, impregnation, and kidnapping offspring of such rapes” (Oriola, 2017).

Trafficking Operations Affirm Ideological Extremism: Western Education as Sin

At its core, Boko Haram’s prime directive is their adoption of a radical form of Salafist ideology and Sharia by rejecting the Western ideals of social and gender equality. Even though the “West” is still attempting to navigate its way through society and gender, terrorist organisations, especially Islamic Jihadist groups like Boko Haram, find the existing norms to be problematic. Demonstrated by forced marriage and impregnation, forced Salafist indoctrination, and armed incursion into schools, particularly the ones encouraging the education of young women, followed by tactical application of human trafficking and child exploitation helps re-assert their beliefs. Their form of puritanical Sharia law favours the patriarchal society with Islamic values, in that women are made for men, and sooner or later, they will become a man’s property. The women are considered valuable enough to be expendable in various avenues, but not enough to be respected as individuals with agency. A component of Boko Haram’s ideology is the perception that women are seen as bearers of the future of their group, irrespective of the violent nature of the conception. The “gendered performativity” of the group, its approach to sourcing/outourcing women and girls, and its affiliated utilitarian tactics concerning gender-based violence, especially female suicide bombings, are certainly fortified by the “patriarchal ideational infrastructure of the Nigerian society” (Oriola, 2017).

Conclusion

It would be naïve to consider Boko Haram and other terrorist organisations as irrational actors. While their actions are repugnant and criminal, they are calculated with intention. The group has incessantly and violently killed thousands of unarmed civilians since its inception. Criminal and terrorist enterprises require financial support to maintain and sustain meaningful activity. It is of utmost importance that future research focuses on how gender-based violence is incorporated as a financially based resource. This analysis also calls for additional research on Boko Haram’s tactical advantages including their use of human capital. Boko Haram has repeatedly shown high levels of intelligence in their attacks in addition to the remarkable reliance on the Nigerian and multi-national forces.

This chapter has attempted to reconceptualise Boko Haram's violence against women as a tactical utilisation to gain a financial advantage supporting their larger political and terroristic goals. Forced marriages and sexual slavery allow insurgents to gain control over "human, sexual, and reproductive power, that ensures the victims' loyalty and social power," particularly flourishing in patriarchal societies (Asal & Nagel, Forthcoming). Such societies also allow organisations like Boko Haram to perceive women with objectification. We have articulated the comprehensive value of women as human and reproductive capital that is beyond monetary gain, but also that induces socio-political control. Researchers have previously highlighted territorial control being an important factor influencing the violence against civilians and this chapter adds a distinctive argument to the existing body of literature.

Simultaneously, these socio-political and financial mechanisms do not apply equally to all terrorist groups as terrorist ideologies are unique and nuanced. Their logic and reason may differ from societal norms; however, they often begin with the recognition of a specific "need" or "desire" followed by a method to achieve a favourable outcome. Boko Haram has not fully reconciled or integrated its aspirational caliphate goals with its historical or regional operational capabilities. The creation of ISWAP clearly exhibits the division between Islamic State and Boko Haram's ideologies (Onuoha, 2016). By continuously examining how and why trafficking occurs, we can evaluate our domestic and international justice system response structure. It is through understanding and connecting these two analytical points in which we ask, "Is our justice system *really* designed to address all methods of terrorist criminality?"

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